N152m property dispute: US-based Nigerian asks court to set aside judgment

A Nigerian-American engineer, Anthony Ehiedu Ugbebor, has asked the Court of Appeal to overturn the judgment of the Lagos High Court which declared that his property purchase agreement with a developer, Mr Olukayode Olusanya and Oak Homes Multinational Services Limited had been extinguished by the doctrine of novation.

The Lagos High Court had in the judgment ordered the refund of the N152 million Ugbebor paid for two luxury apartments in Victoria Island, Lagos.

In a Notice of Appeal filed by his counsel, Barrister Nasir Salau of Nasir Salau & Co., challenging the June 15, 2026 judgment delivered by Justice Akingbola George, Ugbebor argued that the trial judge misapplied settled principles of contract law, ignored material evidence, wrongly dismissed his counterclaim, and erroneously refused his claim for specific performance of the property sale agreement.

The appeal arose from Suit No. LD/4471LM/2023, instituted by property developer Olukayode Olusanya and Oak Homes against Ugbebor and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, EFCC, over alleged trespass on two second-floor three-bedroom apartments located at 14A Musa Yar’Adua Street, Victoria Island, Lagos.

Although the Lagos High Court dismissed most of the developer’s claims, it held that the parties’ conduct had effectively terminated their original agreement through novation.

The court also ordered Olukayode and Oak Homes to refund the N152 million previously paid by Ugbebor, while dismissing the engineer’s counterclaim seeking completion and delivery of the apartments or, alternatively, damages.

Dissatisfied with those findings, Ugbebor asked the Court of Appeal to overturn the judgment, restore the validity of the original contract and compel Oak Homes to honour its obligations under the agreement

Ugbebor also urged the appellate court to set aside the judgment in its entirety, arguing that the Lagos High Court’s findings were contrary to the evidence and established legal principles governing contracts.

He maintained that the original agreement remained valid and enforceable and asked the Court of Appeal to compel Oak Homes to honour its contractual obligations.

One of his principal complaints is that the trial judge wrongly placed the burden of proving payment on him instead of the claimant.

According to the Notice of Appeal, the judge erred in holding that he failed to make payments within contractual timelines despite evidence that the payment structure under the agreement was tied to construction milestones rather than fixed dates.

The appellant argued that under the payment schedule contained in Exhibit CW1, 35 percent of the purchase price became payable upon completion of the roofing stage, while the final 20 per cent became payable only upon completion of the apartments.

He maintained that the agreement never required payment on fixed calendar dates and that he had already paid about 80 per cent of the agreed purchase price even though the developer allegedly failed to attain the contractual milestones.

According to him, the trial judge misconstrued the payment clauses and ignored the unchallenged testimony of the defence witness that substantial payments had been made despite the developer’s inability to complete the project as agreed.

He further argued that under the Evidence Act, the burden of proving non-payment rested on Oak Homes, which alleged breach of contract, and not on him.

A major plank of the appeal is the trial court’s reliance on the doctrine of novation.

Justice George had held that the conduct of both parties created a new contractual relationship which effectively extinguished the original agreement.

However, Ugbebor argued that the finding was contrary to established principles of Nigerian contract law.

Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Heritage Bank Ltd v. Ajugwo, he contended that novation cannot be presumed merely from the conduct of parties.

According to him, for novation to arise there must be a clear agreement by all parties to substitute the original contract with a new one, coupled with an intention to extinguish the previous contractual obligations.

He argued that no witness testified that such a new agreement existed and no documentary evidence established one.

Rather, he maintained that the conduct relied upon by the trial court was consistent only with issues of delayed performance and alleged breach, not the creation of an entirely new contract.

He therefore urged the Court of Appeal to hold that the original agreement remained valid and binding.